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An Unsuccessful Urban Deep Excavation in Soft Soils
Richard Rodgers

Michael Majchrzak

Associate Engineer with Treadwell and Rollo, Inc., Pleasanton,
California

Senior Geotechnical Engineer with Kleinfelder, Inc., Pleasanton,
California

SYNOPSIS This case history p:esents, from a geotechnical engineer's viewpoint, yari~ms techn_ical, budge~, coordination, staffing ~d
"hidden agenda" issues that contnbuted to poor performance of a shored deep excavation 10 soft so1Is. The anticipated and actual construction
procedures are discussed and compared. In addition, approaches to stabilize significant movements of the shoring, and the. methodology
needed to justify a satisfactory future performance of a pile foundation system that was speculated to be damaged are discussed. By
highlighting these issues, it is hoped geotechnical enginee_rs will anticipate and better deal wi_th the issues un~er their influence, unders~d
issues over which they may not have control, and appreciate the need for mutual understandmg and cooperation by members of the des1gn
team.

INTRODUCTION

•

Improper excavation techniques;

Design and construction of a deep excavation in soft soils within an
urban setting is a very difficult task that requires the cooperation and
understanding of geotechnical issues by the design team, contractor
and owner. One deep excavation made in San Francisco in the late
1980's resulted in significant movement of shoring, distress to
adjacent streets, loss of usable building space, significant delay to the
construction schedule, increased costs, suspicion of future
performance of the foundation system, and, finally, litigation. This
paper discusses this case history from a geotechnical engineer's
viewpoint, highlighting the issues involved that may have contributed
to the final unsatisfactory outcome. Many of these issues are
generally not apparent to the geotechnical engmeer until it's too late,
while others are beyond the engineer's control. These issues include:

•

The impact of lateral soil movement on a pile
foundation system;

•

Verification of the reliability of the foundation system;
and

•

The problems with using a larger than normal follower
to drive the piles.

Both the non-technical and technical issues listed above are
discussed in the following sections of this case history as either
distinct issues or incorporated within the description of the actual
construction procedures.

•

Poor initial design review;

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

•

Poor communication between the geotechnical
engineer and the owner/contractor concerning budgets,
areas of responsibility and construction methods;

•
•

Accelerated construction schedule;

The project consisted of the construction of a mixed used high-rise
that includes retail and residential covering half of a large city block
in the South of Market section of Downtown San Francisco. The
structure includes a six-story base structure 220 by 275 feet in plan
with an additional two levels of basement extending below grade.
Two 19 story residential towers were constructed above the base.
The base structure and towers are all of reinforced concrete
construction, with interior and exterior columns carrying loads on the
order of 3,000 and I, 100 kips, respectively.

Errors in construction which took significant effort to
correct;

•

Inexperienced contractor, subcontractors, and owner;

•

Unusual owner relationship between developer, design
professional and contractor;

•
•

Least cost approach to design;

•

The area of San Francisco in which the project is located is land
reclaimed from San Francisco Bay.
In the late 1800's, the
waterfront areas of San Francisco were diked off from the Bay by
seawalls, and sand and rubble fill was placed landward of the walls
to provide developable land. The fill was generally uncompacted
and, consequently, remains loose even today. At the project site the
fill varies from approximately 10 to 25 feet thick, and is underlain by
about 60 to 80 feet of compressible marine clay known locally as Bay
Mud.
Bedrock consists of interbedded weak shale and hard
sandstone found at depths ranging from about 90 to 120 feet below
the ground surface. Groundwater at the site fluctuates with the tide,
but is generally on the order of 10 feet below the ground surface.
An idealized subsurface profile is shown on Figure 1.

The use of "second tier" staff for supervision during
night shift; and
Difference between acceptable movements and failure .

The above issues are in addition to the technical issues that may
ave had an impact on the cause of the shoring movement, and the
npact on the foundation system. These issues include:

•
•

The excavation required to construct the two level basement was
about 28 feet deep and extended below the fill at the site and into the
Bay Mud. The groundwater level is approximately 18 feet above the
base of the excavation. To support the large column loads, and resist
the hydrostatic uplift due to the groundwater, the foundation for the

Slope stability of excavations in Bay Mud;
The i!flpact of disturbance to the earth berm shoring
retentlon system;
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Figure 1
Idealized Subsurface profile

Idealized Subsurface Profile
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development is a pile supported mat. The mat is two and one-half
feet thick except at pile caps where it is typically five feet. Piles are
12 and 14-inch square precast prestressed concrete ranging in length
from about 70 to 110 feet. The total number of piles driven for the
project was about 1100. Each pile was designed to be driven to
bedrock and to support 130 tons of combined dead and live loads.
ANTICIPATED CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES
Construction of the basement required a deep shoring system. To
reduce the amount of dewatering, the structural engineer suggested
that a braced sheet pile shoring system be used. The system was
designed by an experienced shonng designer, using lateral earth
parameters presented in the original soils report for the project.
Following the initial design of the system, the Clwner requested a
redesign due to cost constraints. As a result, the lateral earth
pressures were reviewed by the geotechnical engineer, and higher
passive pressures were provided as a result of adding a friction angle
to the cohesion properties of the Bay Mud. The redesign of the
shoring system, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars in
savings, consisted of braced sheet piles, approximately 50 feet long,
with two levels of internal braces (struts).
The design and
sequencing of the shoring installation was closely tied to the
installation of the pile foundation. The sequencing consisted of:
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1.

Drive the sheet piles around the site perimeter;

2.

Excavate to a depth of 6 feet to install the upper waler for
shoring system and install precast concrete piles to SUPI
foundation loads;

3.

Following internal dewatering, excavate a 1 to 1 (horizot
to vertical) sloped berm from the depth of 6 feet to
bottom of the mat grade;

4.

Construct central portion of the mat covering approximat
one-half of the center of the basement;

5.

Install the first row of internal braces;

6.

Excavate berm to approximately 10 feet above the bottom
the mat grade and install the second row of braces; and

7.

Excavate remainder of berm to reach final grade.

The excavation sequences are illustrated on Figure 2 below.
Prior to installation of the sheet piles, the geotechnical engin1
reviewed the shoring design in accordance with the City of S
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Figure 2
Bermed Excavation Construction Sequence

Construction Sequence
- Bermed Excavation

Sheet Pile Wall

Stage 1 - Excavation to
Founding Level

Stage 3 - Excavation of Upper Section of Berm
& Installation of Lower Struts

Stage 2- Construction· of Base
Slab & Installation
of Upper Struts

Stage 4- Completion.of Excavation

Francisco's requirements for the excavation permit application. The
purpose of the review was to evaluate whether the soil parameters
used in the design were in accordance with those recommended by
the geotechnical engineer. The shoring review was performed by a
staff engineer who, because of the firm's literal interpretation of the
purpose of the review, did not extend his review beyond soil
parameters. The inclination of the berm slope, the depth of the
shoring to prevent heaving, and the construction stages were not
checked for stability. The shoring designer indicated that movement
of the shoring system would generally· be limited to about 2 inches,
and that would be tolerable for the adjacent streets and underground
utilities.

the foundation piles from the grade initially indicated. In order to
address the concern regarding the performance of the pile using the
follower, during the indicator pile program (which aids in estimating
production pile lengths), the piles were driven with the anticipated
length of follower, and at two locations, extra long piles were driven
next to piles driven with the follower in order to evaluate the
difference in pile driving with and without the follower. It was
found that the energy dissipation associated with the use of the
follower was equivalent to about 8 blows per foot with a Delmag
D36-23 diesel pile hammer.
A concern was also raised by the geotechnical engineer regarding
the method of excavation. The concern addressed the use of steep
temporary construction slopes during excavation that could result in
local failure in the Bay Mud and significant lateral movements.
These movements are generally are unnoticed during excavation, but
based on the experience from an adjacent project, could result in
significant lateral deflections of the foundation piles before they are
incorporated into the structure.

The above outlined construction procedures required that the piles
to support the building be driven at a grade approximately 22 feet
above the design pile cut-off grade. Concerns were expressed by the
geotechnical engineer that driving piles from this height above the
design pile cut-off grade would: 1) require the use of a longer than
normal follower that would make it difficult to evaluate final
performance of the pile; and 2) increase the potential for pile
damage. Pile damage was a concern because many of the piles were
expected to extend above the design pile cut-off grade because of
variations in the bearing strata, and damage to the piles may occur
during the excavation stage to reach design subgrade. · ·The owner
and contractor ignored the engineer's concern and elected to drive
Third International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu

ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS
Following removal of the existing asphalt parking lot at the site, the
sheet piles for the shoring system were driven. The driving of the
sheet piles resulted in densification of the loose sand fills at the site,
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tower cranes and to install dewatering sumps, stockpiled mateJ
and soil at the top of steepen slopes, and excavated in the str
behind the shoring where dmgonal corner bracing was located, al
which resulted in additional movements. Ultimately, the maxin
shoring movement was over 18 inches, which resulted in the los
usable basement space and distress to adjacent streets and utilities.

with corresponding settlement of the adjacent streets of
approximately 6 to 12 inches, with some initial minor cracking. The
initial excavation was then made, but was inereased from 6 to 8 feet
in depth by the contractor for easier installation of the perimeter
waler. During this initial excavation, the top of existing wood piles
were encountered that were speculated to be part of an old wharf.
These piles were determined by the contractor to interfere with the
installation of the new concrete foundation piles for the building, and
as a result the owner agreed to their removal. Over 300 piles were
removed, most within about 60 feet of one side of the shoring. The
shoring designer requested that the holes resulting from the
extraction of the wood piles be filled with sand or grout. During
removal of the wood piles, the contractor found that filling of the
holes was not practical without expensive equipment and chose to
forego the backfilling without notifying the shoring designer.
Throughout this period of time, the geotechnical engineer was not
aware of any work occurring at the site.

During the excavation process, it was uncertain as to what im
the movement of the shoring would have on the foundation pil~
the building. Following excavation for the central mat, most o1
piles nearest the location from where the wood piles were extra
were found to be 4 to 19 inches off design location, wit
preponderance of mislocations away from the shoring. '
mislocation could have been the result of lateral movement of
shoring or the earth berm during excavation, errors made in
original pile location layout, piles inadvertently driven off 1~
(especially with the use of a long follower, which made vi
tracking impossible), or a combination of these. It was determ
that only the lateral movement scenario would have a signifi
impact on the future performance of the structure, since the 1
could be either broken or overstressed laterally. As a result, vm
attempts were made to verify the adequacy of the piles to suppor
design vertical and lateral loads. The first attempt was based or
assumption that any pile that had been elastically deflected by
movement would possess sufficient strain energy to bounce bac
freed by removal of soil on the tension side. A large diameter a
was used to remove the soil from the tension side, but due tc
plastic nature of the Bay Mud at design pile cut-off grade, this
approach proved inconclusive. Sonic testing of the piles also pr•
to be inclusive. Finally, two vertical and lateral pile load tests ·
performed, using the adjacent piles for reactions. These tests sh<
the piles were capable of supporting at least 150 percent oJ
vertical design load. It was concluded that the piles are capab:
supporting the design loads as long as the pile caps and assoc
mat are sufficiently reinforced to evenly distribute the design 1<
In this way a single pile defect, if any existed, would only ha
minimal effect on the mat as a whole.

After the initial excavation was made, the wood piles extracted, and
the area regraded to allow for access by the pile driving rig, the
production piles were driven under the observation of the
geotechnical engineer. Because of the proximity of the site to the
financial district of San Francisco, all pile driving had to be
performed at night, which resulted in. "second tier" management by
the contractor. During pile driving, the amount of penetration into
the bedrock to achieve adequate support was found to vary
significantly, even in the same pile cap. Differences of up to about
10 feet in a 15 by 15 foot pile cap were found. This resulted in a
large number of piles with the tops above the design pile cut-off
grade.
During production pile driving, the portion of the sheet pile shoring
adjacent to where the wood piles had been removed, was found to
have moved several inches toward the excavation. These movements
were larger than anticipated at this stage of construction. It was
decided to monitor the movements of the shoring system on a weekly
basis.
Following production pile driving, excavation began without prior
review of the operation by the geotechnical engineer, as required by
the project specifications, and without notification to the geotechnical
engineer. When approximately one-half of the excavation for the
central mat was completed, the geotechnical engineer noticed, during
an unrelated site visit, that near vertical temporary cut slopes of up to
15 feet in height had been made in the fill and Bay Mud, counter to
the original recommendations by the engineer. There was a concern
that lateral movements could have an impact on the piles that
extended above the design pile cut-off grade. The excavation
operation was stopped, and procedures were changed to perform the
excavation more uniformly across the site. During the excavation
movement of the shoring adjacent to the location where the wood
piles were pulled continued to occur. At one point, a maximum rate
of about 1/8 inch in a 24 hour period was measured. These
movements were additionally impacted by the contractor creating
steeper than designed inclinations at the toe of the berm slope and
insufficient dewatering of the interior of the site which result~ in
constant water infiltration. The insufficient dewatering caused the
near fluid B~y Mud to flo": !nto th~ e~.c~~ation w.here exposed in the
berm. This created additiOnal mstab1hty dunng the excavation
process.

After completion of the project, legal action was brought b)
owner against the geotechnical engineer and the shoring designe
material and delay costs, estimated to be approximately six mi
dollars. The engineers cross-filed against the contractor. The
was settled out of court, with the terms not disclosed.
ISSUES
In reviewing the construction of the project, the problems
occurred were found to result from many issues, with no spe<
issue easily identified as the main source of the problems. TJ
issues include technical, budgetary, coordination, staffing,
"hidden agenda" issues not initially understood by some of the de
consultants. These issues are discussed below.
A unique characteristic of the project was the partnership that rr
up its ownership. The development was owned by a lim
partnership consisting of a developer, the ~eneral contractor for
project, and one of the a design engineenng company, along ,
numerous minority partners. The make-up of this partnership
not apparent to the geotechnical engineer at the outset of the proj
and became known to him only after difficulties arose in which
contractor was at odds with the geotechnical engineer regarc
appropriate solutions.
In instances where this occurred,
contractor would, on occasion, invoke his position as an owne
reject decisions which were unfavorable to him. Because of this
usual relationship between owner/designer/contractor did not alv
exist. Decisions affecting the contractor's work were difficul
discuss with the ownership partners, and criticisms of procedure
quality of work were sometimes rejected outright. In general, t
was a perception by the contractor/owner and that he knew besl
the project regardless of the criticisms or recommendations prese
by consultants. This attitude contributed to problems with excav~
and shoring techniques, and hindered implementation of solutions

Beca~s~ of concerns of the impact on the schedule of emergency
!emed1ation, m~sures to address the movements· were not
Implemented until after the shoring had moved about 10 inches into
~e .ex~vation. The measures implemented included decreasing the
mch?ation of th~ berm slope from approximately 1-1/2 to 1
(honzontal ~ yerucal) to between 3 and 4 to 1. This measure was
fo.un? to .Slgmficantly slow' the rate of movement, but did not
ehmmate :t. As a result of using ~is scheme, the lateral extent of
the berm m~eased and the plan SIZe of the central mat had to be
reduced, .whtch resulted in longer internal bracing (struts). During
the remamder of the excavation, the contractor many times ignored
the concerns of the geotechnical engineer concerning the. precarious
balance that had been achieved by the remediation scheme and
elected to make near vertical notches in the earth berm to con'struct
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Review by the geotechnical engineer of the shoring system
performed by a staff engineer relatively inexperienced in this typ
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construction activities were carried out during the day. As a result,
senior personnel of the general contractor were on-site durin~ the day
and the night shift was usually manned by junior or second tier staff.
These people were generally Inexperienced with the issues they, were
called upon to decide during the pile driving. The e<;>~plex1ties of
the site and the variable nature of the subsurface cond1tions resulted
in several situations which could not be resolved on the spot by th,e
contractors night staff. Delays were therefore incurred, usuallY. until
the next day, while the proper people were contacted and the 1ssues
resolved.

excavation. Although the review fulfilled "the intent" of the review,
a more in-depth review would have revealed that the design
inclination of the berm slope was probably too steep for the Bay Mud
conditions at the site, that the depth of shoring below the bottom of
the excavation was probably not sufficient to avoid heave, and the
stability of the shoring during the various stages were not sufficient
to limit movements to the originally anticipated 2 inches. In short,
the shoring design was not overly conservative and was very
sensitive to errors in installation and any unanticipated conditions.
However, since movement be~an at a stage of excavation before the
above items could have sigruficantly impacted the stability of the
excavation, it is unknown what influence they would have had on the
ultimate performance of the shoring if other things had not gone
awry.

Finally, consideration should be given to assessing the difference
between acceptable movements and failure. Although there .were n:o
drastic shoring failures during the project, movement of 18 mches 1s
beyond that acceptable for this t)'l>e of excavation. The process to
estimate lateral movements of shonng systems are generally based on
experience, rather than the use of analysis. For this project, the
original estimate by the shoring designer of two inches of lateral
movement was probably based on previous projects that most li!'elY
included excavations other than in Bay Mud sites. The two mch
movement was probably an underestimate due to the significant
amount of movement required to develop maximum passive pressure
in the Bay Mud. A technical approach should be used to estimate the
lateral movements of the shoring more accurately. In this way,
problems within the design scheme and parameters used may be
found before the system is installed.

There was no pre-construction meeting to discuss the soil report or
procedures for excavation recommended in the report. Essential
recommendations given by the geotechnical engmeer had been
omitted from the construction documents either throu~h oversight or
as cost cutting measures. Specific recommendations regarding
excavation procedures were omitted.
Recommendations for
backfilling of voids created by the removal of timber piles were
dispensed with because of costs. During the initial stages of
construction it was apparent, in hindsight, the trend the contractors
attitude would take toward the consultants and their
recommendations. Recommendations were selectively implemented
and changed, including the depth of initial excavation, which was
increased,

CONCLUSIONS
It is the intent of the authors in presenting this case history to show
that unsuccessful results can be caused by issues which are not
specifically related to the technical aspects of design.
The
geotechnical engineer should be aware of these non-technical issues
and their possible impact on the performance of the design. In
addition, when providing technical services, consideration should be
given to addressing issues other than those specifically requested by
the client or governmental agencies.
The overall success of
geotechnical aspects of the project may depend upon details not
directly the responsibility of the geotechmcal engineer.

Because of deadlines related to financing and tax considerations the
project was on an accelerated construction schedule. Pressure was
therefore placed on fast-tracking foundation installation and basement
excavation. A number of design details associated with these
activities were overlooked inadvertently because of haste, and others
were not implemented because they were considered too time
consuming. Excavations were made in excess of the depths
prescribed by the sequencing and were not properly braced when old
foundations were removed below the depth of planned excavation,
and other activities were carrier out without notifying the responsible
consultant. Consultants were not informed either through ignorance
of the contractor, or to avoid their possible objection to the
procedures being used. As a result, the geotechnical engineer was
often unaware of activities under his purview until after the fact, and
sometimes after significant problems had arisen. This is especially
true in association with the pulling of the existing wood piles, and
lOt refilling the resultin~ voids. As a result of allowing the Bay Mud
:o squeeze into the vo1ds created by pulling nearly 300 piles, the
.ntegrity of the earth berm to restrain the shoring was reduced.
:nteraction with the geotechnical engineer would have hopefully
-esulted in another approach that would have filled the voids, such as
:routing of the voids as the piles were extracted.
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The architect for the project was an out-of-town firm that did not
naintain an office in the locale of the project to service it.
:ommunications were initially handled through the contractor's
uperintendent. As the project pro~ressed, a full-time construction
1anagement specialist was brought m by the ownership. However,
is primary function was to control costs. As problems with work
rogress arose, discussions with the project manager became more
jversarial and not conducive to solving problems, especially where
elays and/or additional costs were involved.
When shorin~ movements became excessive, rather than halt
'cavation until an adequate solution could be formulated, the
mtractor and construction manager insisted excavation of the site
:oceed ~d a solution be found as the work was in progress. This
:suited m several attempts at arresting the movement which failed
~~~e of slow impl.ementation, poor design, and changing
•nd1tions as the excavation progressed. In the end, excavation work
iC1 to be halted, portions of the site backfilled, and after days of
•lay, started anew with a drastically changed excavation and shoring
heme.
3ecause of the location of the project near the financial district of
n Francisco, all pile driving had to be performed at night. Other
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